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Abstract
Despite its remarkable growth in recent years, the study of populism has long suffered from the lack
of a comprehensive theory about its causes, development, and outcomes. Yet, no such theory can be
arrived at before previously having resolved what “populism” really is (and what it is not). Good def-
initions, therefore, require a prior conceptualization of the phenomena we classify as populist, and
want explained. Like planets, which are hard to define but easier to conceptualize as the component
parts of our solar system, modern populism is better understood as a novel political system that main-
tains electoral democracy while also working against the principles of political liberalism. Based on
such a conceptualization, we may define populism simply as “democratic illiberalism,” which opens
the door for new empirical research and worthwhile theory-building.
Keywords: Populism; Democratic Illiberalism; Minimal Definition; Re-Conceptualization; Plane-
tary System; Theory-Building.
Many academic articles about populism begin by lamenting the conceptual confusion surrounding
the topic, then go on offering their own definitions and other clarifications, only to inexorably end up
having further muddied the waters. Philippe Schmitter’s essay (2019), which is the point of departure
for the present symposium on populism, serves as a typical example of such fruitlessness. It begins with
a blunt acknowledgement that “[n]o topic in the contemporary practice or study of politics is more
debatable than ‘populism’ […] [since it] can mean many quite different things” (p. 76). Then he vows
to “try the impossible: [i.e.,] define contemporary populism in a ‘neutral’ fashion” (ibidem) — a task
for which he employs two-hundred-and-one words. But this is in vain, and so our author admits defeat:
“Alas,” he writes, “I have no comprehensive theory to offer for determining why and when [populism]
will emerge” (ibidem).
The question is thus raised: What does it take to build a theory of populism? The answer is that
it takes clear definitions, as well as the meticulous comparative analysis of the cases that are available
for empirical research. The order of operations that have to be performed in order to arrive from com-
prehensive definition to composite causal theory is condensed in the graph below. The whole process
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begins at bottom with a lucid and unambiguous definition of the topic under consideration — in our
case “populism” — and then proceeds with a classificatory scheme that enables telling populists apart
fromnon-populists. Based on such a classification, one should then be able to select the cases of populist
occurrence andbegin their systematic study in comparative fashion. If lucky enough, causal patternswill
emerge that are common among the cases, whichmay then lead to interesting propositions, which, after
been tested, may give rise to a sound theoretical framework addressing the major questions in the study
of populism: What causes it in the beginning, and how it develops subsequently? How does populism
rule when in office? Which are the long-term consequences of such a rule?
To be sure, the travel upwards from definition to theory is hard and demanding, but the first major
difficulty appears already at the starting point. For, aminimal definition is hard to come by unless it has
sound and well-specified conceptual foundations. Concepts are the basic units of our thinking when
trying to make sense of reality and, for this reason, they stand prior to defining the phenomena that we
want explained. Concepts, moreover, derive fromour living experience and, in a very real sense, embody
our contemporary and current historical and political realities. To give an example, since my concept of
modern Greek democracy is different from Socrates’ concept of his ancient Athenian democracy, each
of us would be expected to arrive at different definitions of “democracy” and, from there, follow quite
different paths towards democratic theory-building. In similar fashion, no definition of modern pop-
ulism is possible without a clear conceptualization of this phenomenon in its various interactions with
contemporary political reality. On that account, it can be said that we have a concept of populismwhen,
first, we achieve a common understanding of what we are talking about when uttering the word “pop-
ulism,” and, second, are able to distinguish populism from non-populism. It is then, and only then,
that we may transfigure our concept into a usable definition and begin our upward odyssey in search of
theory as depicted in the foregoing graph.
To better exemplifywhy a clear conceptualization should always precede our attempts to define pop-
ulism, let us transposementally to another science, astronomy, and ask ourselves: What is the definition
for “planet?” To be sure, there are many definitions that vary from anything moving around the sun;
to things with moons; things that are big enough to see with your eye; things pulling the earth around
their orbits; large rocky bodies in the solar system. None of these definitions is good enough considering
reality: Asteroids also move around the sun; Mercury and Venus lack moons; Uranus or Neptune are
not visible to the eye; the only thing that pulls the earth around its orbit is the sun; besides the terrestrial
planets, the solar system also contains the gas giants of Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune. To make
things even worse for definition buffs, one has simply to query whether any definition proposed is also
good for extrasolar planets.
Mypoint is that, without a clear definition for “planet,” one cannot be certain about howmanyplan-
etary bodies are out there. To the Greeks and Romans, our solar system included seven planets. When
I went to school I learned that the number of known planets is nine. By the time my children became
of school age, that number had been decreased to eight following the 2006 decision of the International
Astronomical Association to demote Pluto from planethood. Even more recently, many astronomers
have suggested stretching the definition of the word “planet” so as to include about two hundred bod-
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ies! The word in that case would mean anything orbiting around the sun that is big enough to take the
shape of a sphere.
But, as already said, definitions are bad when stated irrespective of the concept that keeps hidden at
their core. With regard to planets, their concept (that is, the key idea that people have inmindwhen they
say “planet”) is simple to state: A planet is one of a small number of bodies that dominate a planetary
system. The implication is that, by studying planets, we just want to explainwhat the solar system is and
how it works. And here comes a lesson, too: No definition of “planet” should be formulated without
taking into account the role these bodies play in the working of the solar system.
Leaving astronomy aside and returning to our own object of interest, how are we to grasp the con-
cept of “populism” before attempting to formulate a definition of it? The best way, I submit, is by
simply asking ourselves what is actually prompting our recent obsession with populism. In this respect,
there are two chief questions to ask: (1) why do we have to study populism now? And (2) why our cur-
rent study of populism is so full of consternation and dread for the future of democracy? The answers
to these questions are disarmingly simple: To the first question, the reason for the lack of previous sys-
tematic research on populism is that, during the early postwar decades at least in Europe and theUnited
States, it hardly existed; it is only in recent decades that populism has grown strong, also proposing it-
self as a novel political system. To the second question, the reason of widespread anxiety about the rise
of populism is precisely the attractiveness of the political novelty it represents: while it preserves all the
characteristics of democracy, populism dispenses with its liberal nature, actually presenting as the main
foe of contemporary liberal democracy.
The realization that populism represents a novel political systemwhich is attractive precisely because
it maintains electoral democracy but discounts liberal institutions, constitutes a wholly new reconcep-
tualization of the phenomenon which places it squarely within contemporary politics against a back-
ground of liberal democratic decay. In a way analogous to the study of planets, our concept of pop-
ulism, and real reason of why we study it, pertains to our need to understand, explain, and possibly
prevent the dangers it poses to both the present functioning and the future of contemporary liberal
democracy. With such a conceptualization in mind, it is now easy to define populism simply as, and
use synonymously with, democratic illiberalism. This definition has at least three great advantages.
First, it is a truly minimal one in that it includes just the two core characteristics of populism: a sem-
blance of democracy combined with a dismantling of liberal institutions. Second, it is historically and
geographically specific since it effectively differentiates between liberal democracies being transformed
into a populist direction from (pseudo) “populism” in states with entrenched illiberalism, like Russia or
Turkey. Third, this definition lends itself nicely as a normative idea of how populism, once in power,
may sap the liberal roots of contemporary democratic systems and, occasionally, even lead to autocracy.
Above all, the definition of populism as “democratic illiberalism” is perfectly suited to lead students
of populism through each of the steps that one needs to take for traveling the distance that separates
definition from theory. It also promises that the theory thus produced will succeed where Philippe
Schmitter and a good many of other scholars have been defeated, that is, to determine, not only why
and when populismmay emerge, but also to predict the outcomes of populist rule in those nations that
are unlucky enough to have experienced it.
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